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Chapter 1:
Introduction

[I]

China before the Internet
Citizens around the world are using the Internet to connect with an international

community, speak out against governmental injustices, and dissolve informational barriers. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a regime known for its strict control and harsh repression, is
faced with the challenge of balancing an appropriate amount of civilian freedom on the Internet
while still maintaining its monopolistic power. How does a one-party system successfully
maintain control over the flow of information and sustain its unchallenged control of citizens in
an increasingly-liberalized world? The Party’s answer to this question is a finely-tuned Internet
censorship strategy, which this paper seeks to investigate.
Days after the Tiananmen protests of 1989, Deng Xiaoping admitted to the country that
“the single biggest mistake the leadership had made in the eighties … [had not] been opening the
economy, but a lack of ideological and political education to go with it.”1 Following this
epiphany, the Party focused on reestablishing the power of political institutions and controls.
Since this statement and the subsequent attempt to gradually liberalize the country, balancing
regime control while allowing citizens certain freedoms has been a continued struggle for the
CCP. The implementation of the Internet has allowed for greater personal freedoms among
citizens, as expected, but the Chinese government has carefully ensured that these freedoms
remain restricted.

1
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41.

[II]

Rise of the Internet
In 1994, the Internet was introduced in China and was strategically, but hesitatingly,

supported by the Party in order to enhance its public image as an open and progressive country.2
When it first appeared, the Internet was seen by others as a potentially democratizing force in
China. This expectation has proven unrealistic, however, as the Party has carefully crafted a
censorship strategy to contain the Internet’s liberalizing effects. Initially, the Internet presented a
direct threat to the CCP: it did not simply serve as a means for communication and research; it
offered the masses the opportunity to air their opinions and discontent with little censorship. It
allowed for the dreaded possibility of political reform through the voice of the people. The Party
had the right to be intimidated: within ten years of the Internet’s introduction, China had the
greatest number of online users in the world. The number of Chinese citizens online in just two
years, from 2006 to 2008, jumped from approximately 125 million to over 300 million.3 Today,
there are over 500 million Internet users in China, with hundreds of millions maintaining public
blogs.4 Now that the Internet is so intricately interwoven through China’s modern-day culture,
the CCP has buckled down on its approach to controlling the spread of information.
While the few neighboring international powers with censorship strategies have gradually
liberalized their censorship policies, China has shown no tendency to follow suit. The Party has
actually tightened its grip on the Internet population, as we will see in this essay. Chinese
citizens, additionally, are aware of the CCP’s increased control: whereas 52 percent of Chinese
users trusted the reliability of online content in 2003, that number had fallen by one-half, to 26
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percent, in 2008.5 The Party has become increasingly adept at fudging, deleting, and prohibiting
information online, and users have simultaneously become increasingly aware of the big brother
looking over their shoulders. General confidence in the government, on behalf of Chinese
citizens, has suffered as a result.

[III]

Internet in authoritarian regimes
For authoritarian regimes, the Internet is a tricky and sensitive component of civilization.

Similarities have been highlighted between the Chinese government’s approach to Internet
censorship and other authoritarian or totalitarian regimes’ approaches. China continues to secure
the second most censored web in the world, only after Cuba.6 Iran is another example of applied
censorship, but its government’s approach has proven to be much “less sophisticated and slower”
than the Chinese system.7 Though many scholars focus on the intensity of Chinese Internet
policies and the “Great Firewall of China,” we must remember that China is not alone in this
attempt to forcibly quell and form opinions on the web.8 Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and India are
some neighboring countries included in this movement. China is of specific international interest,
however, because of its status as an economic world leader. We must consider China’s economic
liberalization in contrast to its lack of Internet freedom and wonder if this will inhibit, or
promote, its steady rise in the global setting. In order to compete internationally, the Party has
been forced to carefully create a censorship approach which will both allow for a comfortable
level of citizen freedoms while maintaining an unquestioned monopoly.
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Because of China’s strict censorship policies, the topic receives special international
attention. Applications of censorship include formal regulations and filtering, active intervention,
self-censorship, and quick response. It is estimated that, in 2009, between thirty and forty highprofile activists or dissidents were serving prison sentences for posting anti-communist or
otherwise controversial material online.9 Human rights lawyers, activists, and outspoken artists
are included on the list of imprisoned or disappeared. The treatment of these detained dissidents
is shrouded largely in secrecy, but stories of torture and physical abuse have surfaced from those
who are brave enough to share. These fearless Internet dissidents and their accompanying
publicity, as we will see, have presented a great challenge to the Party’s reputation and stability.
In general, the Party strictly filters searches regarding political and security issues. Social
and non-specific Internet searches are censored, but less severely.10 The relationship between the
Party and its citizens is fragile, and founded largely on deceit. The lack of transparency in this
authoritarian regime has been of increasing concern for citizens, especially after instances of
dishonesty that have resulted in a loss of human lives. Such events have included censorship of
the SARS epidemic, the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, and the Wenzhou train crash of 2011.
Citizens are becoming increasingly aware of and uneasy about the tainted information fed to
them by the government.

[IV]

Challenges
Recently, in response to the CCP’s corrupt behavior, bloggers have been utilizing the

Internet as an outlet for their discontent. One notable post by a blogger encapsulates the
frustrations of millions within China: “when a country is corrupt to the point that a single
9
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lightning strike can cause a train crash, the passing of a truck can collapse a bridge, and drinking
a few bags of milk powder can cause kidney stones, none of us are exempted. China today is a
train traveling through a lightning storm. None of us are spectators: all of us are passengers.”11
Whereas the Chinese government’s dissemination of propaganda has worked to brainwash and
control information in the past, this system of secrets and lies is no longer quite as effective. The
Internet has increased the opportunity for the online population to discover holes and
inconsistencies in the CCP’s stories, and citizens are subsequently expecting the Party to be held
accountable for its lack of transparency.
On average, China experiences over ninety thousand social uprisings per year. Most are
sparked by government corruption, officials’ inappropriate use of power, domestic issues, or
Internet restrictions.12 To thwart potential online attacks, the CCP has upped its internal security:
billions of dollars and millions in manpower have been poured into the censorship operation. The
Party’s sledgehammer response to blossoming online uprisings have, for the most part,
effectively discouraged citizens from attempting to spark revolution. Though the government is
able to silence murmurings of discontent online, its failure to address and solve the citizens’
concerns could soon be very detrimental to its relationship with the people.

[V]

Overview
It seems that the Party’s main goal of its censorship and restrictive policies are to prevent

Chinese citizens from speaking out against the government and its monopolistic power. The CCP
has gone to extremes to silence dissidents and has thus far been successful in maintaining the
status quo, but it is not without consequence. China’s international audience is acutely aware of
11
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the country’s dissidents and the Party’s strict, unreasonable reactions to their behavior.
International newspapers are headlined with stories of controversial Chinese actors, including
artist Ai Weiwei and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. Pictures of Ai’s torture-induced
head wound and tales of Liu’s mysterious forced disappearance flood the Internet, generating
international disapproval of the Party’s behavior. Worldwide, non-governmental organizations
and democratic regimes react loudly to China’s treatment of dissidents. Through campaigns for
the release of imprisoned citizens, public denouncements of the Party’s actions, and
reevaluations of China as a strategic international power, the CCP suffers from repercussions of
its censorship strategy.
In this essay I will examine the strategy of the CCP regarding Internet censorship, the
implications this censorship has on Chinese citizens, and the impact this has on the nation
internationally. I will evaluate the Party’s apparent goals and priorities when applying Internet
censorship, and examine how these concerns shape its strategy. Then, I will investigate the
motivations of the Chinese population when using the Internet and evaluate the effectiveness of
the Party’s censorship strategy on Internet users. We will look at how Chinese citizens being
affected, and dissect examples of censorship, including the Jasmine Revolution, the Wenzhou
train crash of 2011, and the story of Ai Weiwei. Finally, we will confront whether the Party has
paid a price, domestically and internationally, for its strict censorship strategy.

Chapter 2:
The Party’s Censorship Strategy

[I]

Introduction

The [censorship] approach of the Chinese government is similar to that of
Chinese medicine. The emphasis is on the Internet being an organic part
of the body politic. Too much intervention is as bad as too little. Constant
monitoring is necessary so that one knows when and how much to
intervene. The word in Chinese is tiao, which means continuous tuning of
a complex system.1
The effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party’s censorship strategy is a subject of
dispute, but its effort to censor the Internet is indisputable. Flushed with abundant fiscal
resources derived from its rapid economic growth, the CCP-controlled state of the People’s
Republic of China has invested huge resources in ensuring its control over the Internet and has
subsequently gained the “dubious distinction of being a world leader in Internet censorship.”13
Untangling China’s elaborate system of Internet censorship is no easy task. We will need
first to describe and understand the CCP’s strategy and then analyze the specific steps it has
taken to implement this strategy. In this section we will first examine the assumed goal of the
CCP when it created barriers to the access of information online, and then the actual steps the
government has taken to implement this strategy, which consists of complete cutoffs from the
Internet, gentle encouragement to use the Internet wisely, and varieties of self-censorship. We
will describe and analyze the technical, tangible restrictions, as well as the psychological
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pressures applied by the government in achieving its objectives. We will then assess some of the
outcomes of the government’s strategy and evaluate its costs and benefits.
Maintaining the CCP’s monopoly without triggering domestic or international backlash is
both complicated and challenging, and the Party has carefully refined its censorship strategy in
order to exercise the appropriate amount of repression. The government’s main priorities are to
increase the marginal costs of access, focus its repressive efforts on political activists seen as
dangerous to the Party, and encourage self-censorship for all Internet users. Established counter
elites with considerable followings are viewed as the biggest threats to the government’s power.
These activists – commonly human rights lawyers, artists, political dissidents, and revolutionary
youth – propagate their discontent with the CCP through blogs and online publications. Though
they present a direct threat to the Communist Party’s stability, they represent a miniscule portion
of the Chinese population. The vast majority of Internet users are categorized as politically
apathetic masses, and typically exhibit no interest in challenging the Party’s authority. The
CCP’s main focus, then, is to prevent the counter elites from connecting with and rallying
support from the apathetic masses online. By maintaining this disconnect, the Party’s primary
responsibility will be silencing a very limited group of revolutionaries, thereby allowing the
remainder of users to surf the web relatively freely.
There are two main methods to censoring the public: the Party will either employ
technical and regulatory restrictions, or it will promote self-censorship and apply more subtle
pressures.14 Under these umbrella categories of censorship fall more specific ways to curb
Internet use. The Ministry of Information Industry, the State Counsel Information Office, and the
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Propaganda Department are the main controllers of the flow of Internet information.15 First,
when establishing an alias or website online, all users must be approved by the government. At
the national level, large agencies and businesses using the Internet to establish an online presence
are forced to receive government approval, and these sites are subject to filtering, blocking, and
controls. At the next tier, private Internet service providers are also required to receive licenses
through the Internet Interconnecting Networks, which will block any unacceptable material. The
final general censored sector are average Internet users who are required to real-name register
with Internet service providers in order to create blogs, post content, and participate in chat
rooms. Again, these users are subject to content control and censorship.16
Next, the behavior of these registered users is consistently monitored. Within the country,
Internet services are based on “interconnecting networks, which are the national backbone
networks that connect domestic Internet service providers (ISPs) to international networks.”17
The state is then effectively in control of the web, as the ISPs are required to obtain permission
from one of the interconnecting networks in order to access the global network. Since these
interconnecting networks are completely controlled by the state, it is especially easy for the Party
to restrict individually created web pages that, in their words and by their definition, “threaten
social order and national security.”18 Aside from the censorship of specific information and
politically sensitive events, the government also completely forbids certain websites. In addition,
“all individuals and organizations must obtain approval from the State Council Information
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Office before they publish any kind of news.”19 After website registration, the primary forms of
follow-up censorship include website blocking, content filtering, and keyword alerts.20 The
government also enlists Internet censors and police to enforce appropriate behavior online.
Before detailing these specific branches of Internet censorship, we will first evaluate how the
Party views the threat of the Internet.

[II] How the Party Views the Threat of the Internet
Rupert Murdoch has been quoted stating that advances in communications technology are
without fail an “unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere.”21 The problem with the
Internet in an insecure, power-hungry regime such as the Chinese Communist Party, however, is
not simply restricted to the people’s potential to challenge their government in cyber space. If the
government fears the development of the Internet and decides to ban this technology, it will pay
the price both politically and economically. Aside from losing international respect because of its
reactionary policies toward the information revolution and draconian policies to ban the Internet,
China’s business and economic expansion will suffer greatly. In fact, China would become a
technological pariah state. As a result, the Communist Party has opted for a middle course. While
recognizing the potential dangers of the Internet, because “an unregulated network would shift
power from the state to citizens by providing an extensive forum for discussion and
collaboration,” it also “hails the Internet’s vast commercial potential.”22 By acknowledging the
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power and potential of the Internet and taking control over the web, “Beijing has taken care to
prevent this commercial gold mine from becoming political quicksand.”23
Among all authoritarian regimes, there is a constant struggle to control and monitor
citizens’ behavior without sparking rebellion. The development of the Internet has added a new
dimension to this balance, and in China specifically, there has been a debate regarding the
importance and purpose of the Internet. One opinion among officials is that the Internet is
“crucial to economic modernization,” while the other group “appraises it as a direct threat to the
central government’s control over the country.”24 The control of information within an
authoritarian system requires an overwhelming amount of finesse, and the government has
tactfully addressed the potential dangers. Ultimately, the Party has accepted the Internet as a
critical pillar of their modernization as a world power, and has found that controlling information
and behavior on the web is the correct approach.
As a powerful but insecure authoritarian regime, the CCP values its survival above
anything else. Because the Internet threatens the Party’s monopoly of power, few should be
surprised that the CCP will apply censorship to maintain its control. Confronted with the
possibility of the 500 million Chinese Internet users utilizing the web as an outlet to publicize
opinion or discontent, the Party’s Internet censorship and regulation has “evolved into a
comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and
social use as well as legal domains.”25 The relationship between the Internet and democracy
worldwide is clear, and it is commonly understood that the Internet poses a serious threat to
communist regimes. There is often the expectation that the introduction of the Internet in
authoritarian countries will lead to the regime’s demise, but “Internet use and development in
23
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China has so far failed such an expectation, and some even argue that the Internet has become a
new tool for government control.”26
Many claim that the Internet does not currently pose a serious threat to the Communist
Party’s power. Because China has experienced sustained economic growth, the population is
hesitant to bash a government that has provided them with so much. Nina Hachigian, for
example, believes that in the short term, the Internet could potentially help bolster the Party’s
power: “The CCP’s popularity now so depends on economic growth that its leaders are safer
with the Internet than without it…the power shifts wrought by the Internet will surface clearly
only during an economic or political crisis in a future China.”27 Hachigian goes on to explain that
since the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping “replaced ideology with economic growth as the
cornerstone of future party legitimacy,” Western ideals and concepts began infiltrating China and
its governmental understanding of success.28 Because of this, there is more pressure on the Party
to encourage Internet use than to restrain Internet use. In general, the Party has benefited greatly
by promoting the Internet: the average citizen has no interest in challenging the government’s
authority, and the population as a whole is content with the amount they are able to access on the
web. Though the Party is strictly inhibiting citizens’ freedom of speech, the online masses
remain apathetic. Additionally, with a relatively “free” Internet, China’s international allies and
enemies have less to condemn about the Communist Party.
The Chinese government acknowledges that it lagged behind other international powers
during the industrial revolution and believes that this Internet revolution is one they cannot miss:
“China is determined not to be left behind by neighbors India, South Korea, Japan, and
Singapore,” and it the CCP will continue working to carefully integrate the Internet into the
26
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country.29 The threat of the Internet, then, seems to be less of a concern than the maintenance of
the government as a superpower internationally. Additionally, the Party has thus far maintained a
monopoly over the Internet, and has experienced no serious threats to its power. Attempted
Chinese online revolutions, such as copycats of the 2011 Middle Eastern Uprising, have failed
miserably, and have only cemented the Communist Party’s power. The Party has maintained
constant success in streamlining user behavior online while simultaneously reaping the economic
and political benefits of the Internet.
In 1994, China was officially the 71st country to register onto the global computer
network.30 Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of Internet users in China
quickly surpassed other well-developed countries, and eventually China became the globe’s
leading user of the Internet. For the most part, the Party has stayed one step ahead of its
population, and never have the Chinese citizens been able to successfully use the development of
the Internet to rise up against their government. The CCP has carefully evaluated the potential
for danger, and maintains a tight grip over the challenging portion of its Internet base. Overall,
China’s “Internet control represents an ‘imperfect control,’ aiming at keeping the vast majority
from sensitive materials and preventing the nonconforming small minority from mounting a real
challenge.”31 The censorship strategy is ever evolving, and next we will take a detailed look at
the components of strategy within the government.

[III] Components of the Strategy
The specific methods of censorship are founded on the formal regulations as laid out by
the CCP and associated groups. The Party has implemented technological restrictions that create
29
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barriers for users, as well as filter content before it has been posted. The other censorship
approaches include active intervention by CCP-related advocates for Internet control, and the
encouragement of self-censorship. In this section we will discuss in detail the specific methods
of controlling information on the web, split into the following categories:
(1)

Formal regulations

(2)

Technological Solutions

(3)

Collusion with Service and Content Providers

(4)

Active Intervention

(5)

Self-Censorship

(6)

Quick Response

(1) Formal Regulations. Though the Party has established formal regulations for what
can and cannot be trafficked and discussed on the Internet, they maintain, and exercise, the
power to prohibit essentially any behavior they deem questionable. If a flagged Internet user, for
instance, is innocently perusing international news sites, the Party reserves the right to interfere
on this potentially problematic user’s Internet use. Additionally, in times of latent or impending
crisis, the Party may choose to prohibit Internet use altogether. Formally prohibited discussions,
searches and activity specifically include behavior or information that 1) contradicts the Chinese
Constitution or fundamental laws; 2) challenges or disrespects the regime or socialism as an
institution; 3) attempts to undermine state unity; 4) promotes public discrimination; and 5)
encourages inappropriate behavior, such as endorsing pornography, gambling, the spread of
rumors, etc.32 Additionally, journalists and citizens are forbidden to condemn or discuss without
restriction any of the “Four Cardinal Principles:” “socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat,
32
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the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.”33 This
wide range of prohibited topics results in a very restricted sense of Internet “freedom.”
(2) Technological Solutions. Aside from the censorship of specific information and
politically sensitive events, the government also completely blocks access to certain websites. In
addition, “all individuals and organizations must obtain approval from the State Council
Information Office before they publish any kind of news.”34 After website registration, the
primary forms of follow-up censorship include website blocking, content filtering and keyword
alerts.35
The Golden Shield Project, known alternatively as the Great Firewall of China (GFC), is
the country’s foundation for censorship. It is one of the first-layer barriers users encounter when
attempting to search, distribute, or discuss information online. This aspect of the censorship
strategy is straightforward: if a website is controversial or deemed “not safe” by the Party, it is
blocked by the firewall. When using popular search engines – such as Baidu, Google, Yahoo!,
and Bing! – to research sensitive words, the Firewall responds with a TCP reset, which is
represented by error messages reading “connection timed out” or “this page cannot be found.”36
Then, the GFC blocks all communication from this IP address for about 90 seconds.37 This
serves to remind the user that their behavior is being watched.
The GFC is somewhat easily circumvented by Virtual Proxy Networks (VPNs), which
reroute domestic users through international ports, such as Hong Kong, in order to access a less-
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censored Internet. Though the firewall is the least complex aspect of Chinese Internet censorship,
it still is a maze of censorship strategies.
(3) Keyword Filtering. Keyword filtering is a more advanced form of censorship which
often either requires much more finesse to circumvent, or is completely impossible to avoid. In
most circumstances, if one inputs a sensitive keyword into a search engine, the results will be
blocked by the GFC. Another method of filtering keywords, however, is subtler. We will look at
one example of keyword filtering on Google.cn in 2010. A group of researchers searched “Falun
Gong” and Google.cn responded with 16,900 hits, whereas Google.com, the U.S.-based version
of the search engine, responded with over 880,000 hits.38 China’s version of Google, in other
words, had hid 98% of this politically sensitive topic’s online information. Additionally, the top
twenty results for “Falun Gong” on Google.cn spoke negatively of the movement, brainwashing
Chinese Internet users into believing what the Party wants them to believe.
Certain sensitive websites are “black listed” by the government, and others remain on the
“white list.”39 Black listed sites, such as those specifically pertaining to movements like the
Tiananmen Massacre or Falun Gong, will consistently be represented by error messages. White
listed sites and terms are more fickle, and “when a search engine is given a sensitive (‘white
listed’) query, it may only be permitted to return officially sanctioned results.”40 Additionally,
there appears to be a “second-class white list” of sites, “which have lower priority than those in
‘white list’ but higher priority than other general web sites.”41 For example, when pornographic
terms are searched on Google.cn, “the resulting web sites are not limited to the ‘white list sites’
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[seen] elsewhere, but are still limited to a variety of government controlled web sites.”42 In
addition to these technological restrictions implemented, the government also employs forces to
curb and influence public Internet use.
(4) Active Intervention. China not only has the largest Internet-user base in the world, but
also employs the largest amount of cyber police to monitor behavior online. The Internet police
force started in Anhui in 2000, and soon thereafter twenty other regions followed suit. It is
reported that by the end of 2000, over 300,000 personnel had been hired to control Internet
behavior.43 These “cyber police” work to intercept activists on the web and maintain the
disconnect between activists and the apathetic masses. These police act as “big brothers” on the
web, and will interrupt searches and discussions with the potential to lead to dangerous behavior.
Another aspect of active intervention is a government-recruited youth group, known as the “Fifty
Cent Party.” Similar to Mao Zedong’s strategy during the Cultural Revolution, the post-Mao
regime encouraged school officials to recruit “a team of zealous students to work part time as
‘Web commentators’” in 2005.44 President Hu Jintao expressed that controlling and restricting
Internet activity was not enough; the Party also needed to take advantage of the Internet.
According to one Party official, the government must “thoroughly make use of online
commentary to actively guide public opinion in society.”45
The aforementioned student web commentators are estimated to total to a force of over
280,000.46 These students, recruited by the government as ideal citizens, “set out to neutralize
undesirable public opinion by pushing pro-Party views through chat rooms and Web forums,
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reporting dangerous content to authorities.”47 They are cheap, influential, and easily employed
government workers who help reinforce the Party’s power. This form of censorship not only
helps to restrict citizens from discussing inappropriate matters online, but encourages them to
speak fondly of the government. According to one Party scholar, “in an information society, the
Internet is an important position in the ideological domain. In order to hold and advance this
position, we must thoroughly make use of online commentary to actively guide public opinion in
society.”48 This can be interpreted as the Party’s continued propaganda campaigns, attempting to
brainwash citizens against public disapproval of the regime.
Because Western interpretations have morphed the Chinese translation of “propaganda,”
which “denotes the broadcast and spread of information,” into information tainted by
“untruthfulness, bias, or manipulation,” the CCP has refrained from using the term.49 Instead, the
CCP focuses on “publicizing” or “communicating” on the web to inform and sway its citizens
into believing what it wants them to believe. The strategies used to control the flow of
information on the Internet consist of “informing,” “guiding,” “harmonizing,” “safeguarding,”
and “constraining.”50 This use of propaganda, though not as blatant as it was during the Cultural
Revolution, is still successful in promoting specific ideologies and finely-tuned opinions of the
Party. The CCP has adeptly adjusted its strategy to guide online opinion and discourse by first
gauging common complaints and perfecting responses from Fifty Cent Party members to help
reshape these opinions. In the words of Jiang Zemin, the goals of active intervention are to
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“develop actively, increase control, accentuate the good and avoid the bad, and use it to our
advantage.”51
The government’s objective when employing students and Internet police to influence
cyber activity is to “crank up the ‘noise’ and drown out progressive and diverse voices on
China’s Internet.”52 The CCP carefully applies an appropriate amount of repression so as not to
incite anger among the apathetic majority: the strategy is selective and restrained, and is focused
on the small minority who actually use the Internet for controversial purposes. The everyday user
is not inconveniently inhibited, as “selective press censorship ensures control of political
information without suffocating coverage of pop culture and business.”53 This is especially
important for the free use of blogs, for which interest has grown overwhelmingly in the past
decade.
(5) Self-censorship. The Party also relies on personal applications of self-censorship, and
many users self-censor themselves because of their “limited choices, high governmental
pressure, and potential stiff penalties.”54 Those employed to manage the web have one goal only:
“to safeguard the interests of the Communist Party by infiltrating and policing a rapidly growing
Chinese Internet.”55 Chinese Internet censorship domestically is about “social control, human
surveillance, peer pressure, and self-censorship.”56 Internet cafes, major hubs for bloggers and
apathetic Internet users, have begun cracking down on activity for fear of being held responsible
for customers’ behavior. All “website hosting services are installing keyword-filtering software
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and have hired people to watch online information on their websites.”57 The aforementioned
variations of censorship, such as the Internet police force and “Fifty Cent Party,” additionally,
serve as constant encouragement to censor oneself when online.
John Horton speaks of the phenomenon of self-censorship, and argues that “at the heart
of this concept is a tension between the thoughts of the self-censor as, on the one hand, the
author, and on the other, the instrument, of the censorship.”58 Self-censorship is a psychological
game played between the Party and Chinese citizens. Censorship guidelines, as clarified by the
government, are broad and mostly all-encompassing: they offer little precise direction as to what
can and cannot be discussed, posted, and shared online. Citizens, then, are given the choice to
either play safe in order to avoid any potentially troublesome behavior, or push the boundaries to
test their freedoms. Generally, citizens tend to adjust behavior so as to avoid attracting the
Party’s attention. In this respect, self-censorship is a largely effective method of censorship.
At the start of the new millennium, the government released extensive regulations
prohibiting all content that “subverts state power, ‘disturbs social order,’ undermines
reunification efforts with Taiwan, spreads rumors, ‘preaches the teachings of evil cults,’
distributes ‘salacious materials,’ dispenses pornography, slanders others, or harms the ‘honor’ of
China.”59 Along with these general guidelines, which discourage almost all potentially
controversial behavior, the Party’s exceptionally secretive handling of those who stray from
these guidelines also serves as a promoter of self-censorship. The government purposely hides
details of punishments applied to those countering their censorship guidelines. By maintaining
this air of mystery, the temptation to push the Party’s limits is muddled by the fear of the
unknown consequences.
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(6) Quick Response. In 2011, in response to the powerful and contagious technologically
fueled revolutions of the Middle East and North Africa, mini-revolutions sprouted up throughout
China. One notable revolution, titled the “Jasmine Revolution” after Tunisia’s uprising in 2011,
was crumpled before fully blossoming. The revolution began in February of 2011, first by
shouting protests, which ended in police brutality and violence. To prevent rapid expansion of
the revolutionary ideology, the government responded quickly to the discussion of all things
“Jasmine” online. First, the Party pre-emptively detained democracy advocates, bloggers, and
“would-be troublemakers.”60 State police were seen patrolling the streets of Beijing and
Shanghai, and any hint at revolutionary behavior was immediately addressed. Whereas protests
sparked online in the Middle East led to the mass mobilization of citizens, “the biggest response
[to talk of the Jasmine Revolution] in China was from the state.”61
Because of an extremely responsive and effective Internet censorship strategy, most
citizens were “largely left in the dark” about the Jasmine Revolution. Unless discussed through
word of mouth or witnessed in person, most Chinese “have never heard of the protest calls in
China,” nor were they ever aware of the ensuing crackdown.62 This is a testament to the Party’s
quick response to the use of the Internet as medium for rebellion. As highlighted in US articles
reporting on citizens’ use of the web, attempted rebellions in China almost always remain just
that – attempted. Protests that “directly challenge the authority of China’s ruling Communist
Party usually face a swift and stern response. ‘This shows just how nervous and how insecure the
Chinese government is.’”63 Though the government is extremely skilled in quick responses to
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online threats of any sort, the (attempted) Jasmine Revolution has been noted by some as an
important movement for Chinese citizens. As China researcher from Human Rights Watch noted,
“the government won this [attempted protest] and looks capable of blocking any immediate
threats to its hold on power. But the ease with which dissent spreads online means that while
China isn’t likely to see its own jasmine revolution, the authorities won’t be resting easily
either.”64 This leads us to the next aspect of the CCP’s censorship strategy: its effectiveness.

[IV] Overall Effectiveness of the Strategy
With increased research about the Party’s impact on censorship and Internet use, one
important fact to keep in mind is the main purpose of the Internet for many citizens; the majority
of Chinese citizens use the Internet for “gaming, entertainment, sports news, celebrities, and
study and career opportunities.”65 The need to invest billions of dollars in technological
advances, propaganda, and police forces to curb Internet use, then, may be unnecessary. It is hard
to say how crucial Internet censorship is to the Party’s survival; if the Party invested half as
much as it does now into censorship, for example, would its power crumble or would it remain
an untouched monopoly? We can only judge based on the Party’s success, which is measured by
its maintained power.
Though for the most part, China’s Internet censorship remains relatively peaceful and
mundane, the government occasionally turns to more severe tactics to send a message to its
citizens. Especially since the recent Arab Spring of 2011, Internet and media censorship within
China has been steadily increasing: the government now more than ever “resorts to cutting off
the Internet entirely in areas hit by episodes of social unrest, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner
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Mongolia.”66 In instances where the government assumes there is a citizen upheaval brewing, it
will not merely censor information, but instead prevent any Internet use. In response to the
aforementioned Middle Eastern uprisings, Chinese officials issued a security crackdown to
prevent a similar revolution in China. The “instantaneous deployment of the police to prevent
even notional gatherings in big cities…is just one example of what Chinese officials call
‘stability maintenance.’”67
For those dissidents who ignore, circumvent, and protest against censorship, their fate is
one largely unknown. Within the past five years, persecution and harassment of well-known
dissidents have escalated, and there are currently over 3,500 unexplained detentions for human
rights workers and defenders. These dissidents are held in penitentiaries, “black jails,” and
psychiatric hospitals.68 The government often seizes these outspoken rebels under pretenses other
than inappropriate Internet behavior, and do not publicly discuss what punishments they will
endure.
One example of this is the popular case of internationally-known artist, Ai Weiwei. Ai
was arrested in April of 2011, in the midst of “China’s worst spike in official repression in more
than a decade.”69 Though Ai’s critiques of the CCP and his self-described activism “as an
explicit challenge to the ‘ethics’ of an authoritarian regime” are largely controversial and could
be seen as direct threats to the Party’s monopoly, his government-induced silence was reportedly
for unrelated reasons.70 According to the CCP, the government detained Ai for “unspecified
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economic crimes,” such as evasion of taxes.71 Though accounts of what happened to Ai while in
detention vary, stories of “police brutality” and “corporal punishment and torture” are common
threads through his, as well as hundreds of other dissidents’, stories.72
How to silence dissidents who consistently defy persecution and harassment is arguably
the weakest part of China’s Internet censorship strategy. Out of desperation and disregard for
human rights, Chinese officials reportedly resort to physical violence and psychological
terrorism as methods to scare dissidents out of future inappropriate online behavior. This
treatment then receives domestic and international attention from everyday citizens, human
rights advocacy groups, and governments around the world. In this respect, it seems that the
CCP’s censorship strategy is largely ineffective: one of the primary reasons for censorship is to
trick citizens locally and abroad into believing in the Communist Party and its decency, and they
fail this mission when poor treatment of dissidents goes public. The backlash from Ai Weiwei’s
disappearance, for example, which attracted an overwhelming amount of international attention
and “Free Ai Weiwei” movements around the world and throughout the web, only magnified the
Party’s issues, insecurities, and indecency.

[V] Summary
In general, with constant and growing investments of perhaps tens of billions of dollars in
financial resources and hundreds of thousands in manpower, China has maintained a high degree
of control of the Internet inside its borders. Confronted with the possibility of threats to the
survival of one-party rule that may sprout from widespread Internet use, the Chinese Communist
Party has addressed this potential issue head on. For the moment, the CCP has managed to
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contain threats of the information revolution without suffocating the development of the Internet
as a dynamic new industry. The Party has effectively isolated dissidents from the apathetic
masses, and this disconnect has, so far, eliminated the possibility for active revolution. During
moments of crisis, the Party’s single-minded focus on snuffing out threats of political stability
seems to have delivered desired results, as in the case of the Arab Spring of 2011, when the CCP
was apparently terrified of a similar uprising in China and subsequently silenced potential
revolutionaries.
It will be interesting to see, as time goes on, whether a reduction of censorship in China
will occur. Thus far, their strategy has proven largely successful, and the careful balance of
freedoms and restrictions has been sustained. We must wonder, however, how long the CCP can
stay one step ahead of its population. In the following chapter, we will look into the implications
and results of censorship in China: is there backlash, and how does the Party address it?

Chapter 3:
Effects of Internet Censorship

[I]

Introduction
With the advent of the Internet in authoritarian regimes, the international community has

witnessed a range of different governmental responses. In some countries, authoritarian elites
have been forced by the Internet to increase transparency and trust between the government and
its people. But in other countries, the response has been very different. The introduction of the
Internet in China, for example, has opted for more governmental control, not liberalization. The
arrival of the Internet almost immediately motivated the Party to institute tighter control and
insulate the government from its citizens, as it simultaneously attempts to use this new
technology to improve the image of the government among the public. Whereas regimes in
Malaysia and Singapore are using the Internet for “e-government initiatives that reshape
bureaucracy, dispense education and health information, and increase direct communication
between officials and the public [in order to] actually improve the quality of life for citizens and
boost transparency,” the Chinese Communist Party has invested an unprecedented amount of
manpower and money to ensure the Internet is controlled appropriately in order to, above all,
protect the regime’s unchallenged monopoly.73
According to some experts, China operates the “most extensive, technologically
sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of Internet filtering in the world,” and has proved
largely successful in repressing Chinese voices. Despite external pressures to democratize, the
CCP maintains its strength and security as the ruling party. How exactly does censorship
influence China’s general online masses, its small community of outspoken dissidents, and the
73
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international perception of the Party? In this chapter, we will gauge the impact of the Party’s
Internet restrictions. We will first examine the effects of such censorship on the general apathetic
masses. We will look at specific censored events, such as 2011’s Jasmine Revolution and
Wenzhou train crash, and weigh the impacts censorship had on such situations. Then, we will
evaluate how the “dangerous” dissidents and activists, both those making their way onto the
government’s radar and those already firmly established internationally, are affected. Finally, we
will dissect the effects China’s Internet censorship has on its international reputation.

[II]

The Impact of Censorship on the General Online Masses
(1) Breakdown of Internet users and uses. After overwhelmingly rapid economic growth,

China’s Internet users are mostly well-educated, upper-middle class urbanites. The vast majority
of citizens use the web for Internet games and entertainment. In 2009, the most popular use for
the Internet in China was listening to streamed music; over 80 percent of active Chinese web
surfers regularly listened to online tunes.74 Instant messaging, as opposed to email, is also a very
popular Internet use: 87 percent of users in 2010 used instant messaging applications
consistently, whereas 53 percent used email.75 The largest sector of Internet users are aged 1019, and are mostly utilizing the Internet for access to online games.76 Young adults, university
students, and young professionals, as well, account for the other major segments of Internet
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users. The average Internet user spends about 2.6 hours per day online, with young professionals
and university students spending upwards of 4 hours per day on the Internet.77
The government has witnessed the outstanding majority, a reported 87.5 percent, of
college students and faculty frequenting the Internet.78 The online activity of the universitytrained upper class is especially of concern for the government because of their awareness of a
world outside China. These elites are more likely to have a better understanding of international
politics due to increased access to resources and the ability to travel internationally. Additionally,
they are more likely to use the Internet to research history, current events, and controversial or
politically-charged topics.
The apathetic masses, which account for the overwhelming majority of Chinese Internet
users, are a secondary concern of the Party. It is important to keep in mind that the average
Internet user is not interested in utilizing the web as an outlet to attack the government: “the
logic goes, the Chinese government has engineered a monumental and societal transformation
that has tremendously benefited its people. Hundreds of millions have ascended from profound
poverty. Why would the Chinese people overthrow – or even question – the regime under such
circumstances?”79 To maintain domestic approval, the government has provided substantial and
sustained economic growth. This has proven to be the leading factor in public support, which
therefore allows the Party some leniency when applying censorship restrictions. Economic
growth seems to trump political freedom in this case, by “[providing] satisfaction and distraction
to the population, and, therefore [garnering] domestic support for the Party (or at least reducing
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active opposition to the Party).”80 Though some express frustration with the Party’s control, in
reality very few are actually challenging the system or demanding changes. Later in this section,
we will discuss the potential power of certain groups, such as online bloggers, to challenge the
system.
(2) How the average user views Internet censorship. Many users agree that the
government should censor the Internet for the safety of their children, but their ideas of
censorship contradict the government’s application of restrictions. For instance, 84.7 percent of
users believe pornography should be controlled, 72.6 percent think online violence should be
stopped, and even 15.6 percent want the government to monitor game usage. Only 7.6 percent
believe, however, that politics should be at all censored or hidden from the public.81 Though
users claim they want unrestricted access to politics and government-related websites, surveys
show only 3.5 percent of Internet users often or always visit government websites.82 This
reinforces the government’s perception of the apathetic masses, and allows them to focus efforts
mainly on a portion of that curious 3.5 percent.83
By refining its Internet censorship strategy and allowing the general masses enough
freedom to access entertainment websites, create and use blogs, and even write minimally
controversially in forums and chat rooms, the government is allowing its public enough wiggle
room without allowing complete freedom. This wiggle room has proved satisfactory for the
general public, who, for the most part, continue to show little interest in raising their voices loud
enough for the government to hear. Another aspect of the Party’s strategy has been to utilize the
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Internet to curb negative discussion of the Communist Party but allowing, and even encouraging,
online conversations defaming the United States and Japan.
The results of the Party’s efforts have proven successful: “China’s system of Internet
censorship, control, and propaganda, while in no means impenetrable, is effective enough that
the picture of the world seen by the average Chinese Internet user is skewed in the regime’s
favor.”84 Whereas 79 percent of Internet users trust domestic online news services, only 29.6
percent trust foreign online news.85 This statistic tells us that the Party’s subtle brainwashing is
incurring results. The average citizen is neither suffocated by the censorship nor dubious of the
government’s intentions when applying such restrictions. As long as the government can
effectively maintain the disconnect between the few influential online dissidents and the masses,
then, their Internet censorship strategy is largely successful.
One of the changes affecting all of China’s 500 million Internet users is the enforced lack
of anonymity. Increased restrictions have resulted in required sign-ins of true and confirmed
identities, which encourages self-censorship and discretion when tempted to write politically
controversial blog posts, comments, or websites. Internet service providers have been instructed
by the State Council to “use only domestic media-news postings, to record information useful for
tracking users and their viewing habits, to install software capable of copying e-mails, and to end
immediately transmission of ‘subversive material.’”86 There is a possibility that the online
masses, which would otherwise have no interest in challenging the government, would choose to
mobilize if given the opportunity to hide their identities. By requiring real name logins, however,
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those masses are remaining silent, for the risk of punishment outweighs the rewards of joining an
online movement. Data shows that the Party’s specific approaches to censorship are “effective in
keeping casual users away from sensitive content, [but] are defeated easily through the use of
various technologies.”87 Those who are determined to view restricted content, in other words, are
largely able to do so.
Statistics show that while the number of avid Internet users is increasing, the number of
users that try to circumvent censorship by purchasing proxies has not grown.88 Additionally,
those who use proxies are doing so not to access inappropriate material or gather support for an
offline revolution, but rather simply to “participate in a global online community.”89 This means
proxies are primarily being used for access to foreign, mostly benign sites such as Facebook,
Twitter, and Google Reader; Chinese citizens “engaged in such practices” are aware that the
government “rarely cracks down on them individually, preferring instead to go after prominent
dissidents who publish information about forbidden topics online.”90 Most Internet users,
therefore, feel relatively safe and unrestricted while online, which gives them less of a reason to
challenge the Party for more freedom. However, one segment of the apathetic masses, online
bloggers, has gradually begun to pose a potential threat to the Party.
(3) Bloggers and their relationship with Internet censorship. Bloggers have become
powerful agents in China, and some scholars believe the freedom given to write blogs is enough
to “dig…the Communist Party’s grave.”91 This concern has so far proven unfounded, however,
for at the mention of gathering support for organized political action, users will be quickly and
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effectively censored, and potentially punished or removed from the web. In terms of the
censorship they face, “Chinese bloggers and blog-hosting companies themselves have generally
viewed censorship as part of the necessary tradeoff required for online speech.”92 Many of these
bloggers show no interest in challenging the freedoms they have already been given just to spark
the Party’s further restrictions. They would need to experience “a much more profound and acute
offline crisis” in order to find it worth jeopardizing the “online and offline freedoms they have
gained in exchange for the very uncertain gamble that they might be able to gain even more.”93
Still, the blogging community is unique, for there exists a dangerous tipping point. Though
strictly censored, the Party must be careful to not restrict users too much, or a single online voice
could cause a domino effect.
Chinese bloggers, who have grown in number and significance over the past five years,
have developed a “subversive lexicon” to “ridicule the government.”94 Of the approximately 500
million Internet users, 300 million are said to blog regularly on sites such as Sina Weibo.95 Sina
Weibo’s popularity is seen as a threat: the site could easily be used as a vehicle for mass
mobilization, so the Party has responded to this potential threat by establishing new rules for
both website administrators and users. As of March 16, 2012, users are required to register with
their real names, which forces bloggers to self-censor for fear of government backlash.96
Additionally, all users with over 100,000 followers are considered potential mobilizers, and the
government has mandated Sina Weibo to monitor their posts for controversial material.97
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Because of these newly instituted rules, and consistent government surveillance which results in
the removal of approximately 16 percent of all material, users have experienced increased
difficulty discussing any politically sensitive terms. Bloggers, therefore, have developed careful
plays on words, innuendos, and encrypted terms as a new form of resistance discourse.

[III]

Specifically Censored Events
Generally, Internet censorship as applied by the government forbids users from viewing

or creating websites related to “Taiwan and Tibetan independence, underground religious and
spiritual organizations, democracy activists, and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, [as well as]
selected sites operated by major foreign governments, news outlets, health organizations, and
educational institutions.”98 Additionally, all user-based websites are monitored and restricted so
as to prevent rapid communication and possible mass mobilization. The public has especially
restricted Internet access during certain politically-sensitive events, such as the revealing of Liu
Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize, the July 2009 Xinjiang riots, and the anniversary of the 1989
Tiananmen Incident.99
Chinese citizens are also subject to the possibility of complete cut-offs from technology,
as witnessed during the 2009 riots in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). As a
response to the uprising, the government promptly shut down Internet service providers,
completely prohibiting citizens and potential activists from viewing or posting information
online, thereby cutting off the problem at its root. The citizens of Xinjiang were then without
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normal Internet access for a full 10 months after the riots.100 The Chinese were reminded then
that the Internet and the limited freedom they are provided by the Party is a privilege, not a right.
(1) Jasmine Revolution of 2011. According to the State Security Bureau, China has
experienced a steady increase in organized protest. The “probably underreported” number of
protests grew from 58,000 to over 150,000 from just 2003 to 2005.101 When we peel back the
layers of why, exactly, citizens are choosing to engage in protest or not engage in protest, we
must look beyond Internet censorship as a reason: we must look at what the government is
censoring. In other words, the Chinese citizens’ motivations for speaking out against the
government run deeper than simply the restrictions they encounter. The people are discontented
by the government’s treatment of minorities, disregard of human rights, and lack of personal
freedoms. This is confounded, then, by forced censorship. Whereas some believe the millions
participating in small-scale, makeshift protests are “relatively trivial when considered to China’s
overall population,” this growing number in protests still tells us something.102 The Party,
however, has refocused efforts, money, and manpower to stop offline protests before they
happen.
As Mao Zedong once said, “a single spark could set the prairie alight.”103 The Jasmine
Revolution of 2011 has been compared to the Middle East’s Arab Spring, but Beijing’s reaction
was “swift and overwhelming – harassing reporters, jailing dissidents, and ramping up its
already-aggressive censorship of the Internet.”104 In this instance, though some are skeptical of
how seriously citizens were engaging in the Jasmine protest, the Party’s Internet censorship
100
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proved successful. The Jasmine revolution was compared to a coma patient “waking and
twitching his fingers,” for “the event was small, but its significance large.”105
Citizens were restricted from searching keywords “jasmine” and “Egypt,” among many
others, and the government was able to tag and survey any user who used those words in emails
or online communication. Those encouraging discussion of the planned revolution on microblogs
were swiftly arrested for “inciting subversion,” and over 100 influential and potential leaders
were placed under house arrest nationwide.106 Because the world had recently witnessed the
floundering of Middle Eastern governments due to similar revolutions, the Party overreacted to
this potential threat. The government deployed “thousands of uniformed and plainclothes police
at the sites of the gatherings and strengthened its censorship of Twitter-like services and virtual
social networks.”107 The Party attacked foreign media sites, and cracked down substantially on
Internet censorship in order to prevent any discussion of the revolution online.
Beijing’s “sledgehammer response,” however, sparked conversation domestically and
internationally about just how “paranoid and insecure the leadership is about the risks of
instability in the country.”108 The (attempted) revolution, however, served as an affirmation of
the Party’s monopoly: their swift and effective crackdown on mounting dissidents online has
reminded the Internet community of their unbridled power. Whereas during the Tiananmen
protest of 1989 the government employed tanks to physically crush dissent, the Party has begun
crushing dissent virtually through strict Internet blockages and removal of controversial material.
The CCP has updated its preventative and reactionary behavior to stop dissent before it happens
offline.
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(2) Wenzhou train crash of 2011. The aforementioned Wenzhou train crash is another
example of the Party’s use of censorship. In early 2011, the high-speed rail crash killed at least
39 people and injured over 200, and the government immediately rushed to hush the media and
offered minimal information to victims’ families and shocked citizens.109 Hours after the crash,
“propaganda directives leaked online showed reporters were warned not to run investigative
reports or commentary, or to link the incident to the country’s high-speed rail development.”110
Since the crash was so shortly after the high-speed track’s opening, the incident was a source of
profound embarrassment for the Party. Microbloggers were outraged, however, that the
administration was choosing to withhold the truth from them.111 One blogger, reflecting on the
accident, stated that the Chinese have become “second-class citizens in the Internet Age. A
whole generation is suffering from the lack of freedom of information.”112 Similar stories have
been heard before, in response to censorship of tainted milk powder, the spread of SARS, and
domestic human rights injustices. In all these circumstances, the government has chosen to save
face by restricting Internet and media access, rather than confront issues head-on with candor
and solutions.
In response to the difficulty in uncovering information about the crash, many were
questioning the government’s incentive: is money more important than lives? Are citizens and
their basic rights getting lost in the fight for a continued economic miracle? Censorship, then,
becomes more than just a power struggle; it becomes a safety concern. Because of the incident’s
censorship and the lies fed to the public, bloggers and news anchors questioned whether or not
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this economic development was worth the risk. One CCTV broadcaster spoke for millions when
he commented publically and emotionally on the event: “China, please slow down. If you’re too
fast, you may leave the souls of your people behind.”113
Days after the train crash, protesters gathered around a morgue in Wenzhou to identify
the dead, determine the number killed, and demand answers from the government. “People don’t
trust anything the government says anymore,” a former journalist in attendance at the morgue
stated, “[the public] thinks whatever [the Party] says is a lie.”114 It is statements like these that
explain to us how, exactly, Chinese citizens are impacted by censorship. Yes, their searches and
posts online are restricted, but more than that, their faith in the government is tested. When
citizens are forced to beg for the truth, rally for a statement, and protest for apologies, their
relationship with the government is radically strained.
The Jasmine Revolution and the Wenzhou train crash are just two examples of what
happens during the censorship process. These instances illuminate the impact of censorship on
Chinese citizens: their reactions are founded on more than just frustration. There is concern and
desperation in their attempts to foster an honest relationship with the government. Next, we will
look at the dynamic between the government and influential online dissidents.

[IV] The Impact of Censorship on the Dissident Community
China’s official report on human rights states that its citizens’ “freedom of speech has
been fully guaranteed,” and the report cites the Internet as a “channel for citizens to exercise
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their right to be heard.”115 When compared to the statistics of citizens punished for expressing
themselves on-line, however, this statement is nothing less than a mockery. The Chinese
government “detains a staggering number of people for daring to peacefully express their views,”
and in 2010 alone, there were over 3,500 unexplained detentions of human rights workers and
defenders.116 These dissidents are held in penitentiaries, “black jails” and psychiatric hospitals.117
The government’s description of ever-increasing Internet freedom focuses on its unprecedentedly
large amount of websites, bulletin board systems (BBS), and Internet penetration. It is true that
users do indeed continue growing in number and the amount of content on the web is ever
increasing.118 The important thing to keep in mind, however, is that the government strictly
screens this content. Just because content is provided does not mean that freedom is provided.
(1) The Party’s response to dissidents. Because of their potential to dramatically
influence public opinion, powerful netizens receive harsh treatment from the government.
During the Xinjiang riots of 2009, a few Uighur webmasters were arrested for “endangering state
security” by using politically sensitive language on public forums.119 As punishment for such
behavior, these dissidents were subject to anywhere from three to 10 years in prison. Other
behavior which warrants state intervention includes “insulting and slandering others,” “spreading
terrorizing information and creating a terrorizing atmosphere,” as well as “subverting state
power.”120 Active netizens can also receive serious punishments for leaking “state secrets,” or
discussing politically sensitive topics, such as poisoned milk powder, the Wenzhou train crash of
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2011, and the Sichuan earthquake. These events are considered “secrets” while the government
is still formulating a plan for publicly handling these embarrassments.
A recent report states that China is experiencing the “worst crackdown since 1989 with a
rising number of enforced disappearances of activists,” and the government and other affiliated
groups, such as the mafia, are forcibly removing influential dissidents.121 In response to the Arab
Spring of early 2011, 26 soft or potential dissidents were subject to “enforced
disappearances.”122 Over the past two years, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “the
problem in China has worsened considerably…we know that if they are targeting high profile
individuals there may be many more who are not well known.”123 Though the Party withholds or
alters almost all information regarding the treatment of dissidents, we have seen a trend of
government-funded groups completely plucking potentially influential netizens, artists, and
academics from their respective homes and cutting them off wholly from outside
communication. Information which has managed to slip through the cracks, however, has
repeatedly pointed to physical abuse and torture tactics used as methods of forcing confessions
from dissidents.
Though Chinese officials have been quoted stating that there are no black jails in the
country, international human rights defenders and journalists have discovered multiple “secret,
unlawful detention centers” used to “detain petitioners” and potential threats.124 Human Rights
Watch researcher Phelim Kine explains one jail in Beijing as “an empty government
building…staffed by thuggish men in civilian clothes with sharp brush cuts and the swagger of
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off-duty policemen.”125 These jails have existed in this state since at least 2003, according to
HRW, and dissidents vary in age, apparent crime, and severity of punishment. These prisoners
can be held captive and incommunicado for up to several months. The existence of black jails
“makes a mockery of the Chinese government’s rhetoric on improving human rights and
respecting the rule of law,” according to HRW researchers, and the Party is urged to reconsider
its treatment of dissidents if it expects to garner respect for the regime internationally.126
The CCP, however, has not shown any tendency to reevaluate its handling of dissidents.
The Party has recently revised its Criminal Procedure Law to allow for even more governmental
power. Article 73 of the law would effectively “legalize secret detentions and ‘disappearances’
of people viewed as political risks by the government.”127 This increased Party control is
allowing officials to essentially eliminate the possibility of mass mobilization led by dissidents.
The CCP has the power now to “take dissidents and critics ‘off the grid,’ both to silence them
and to make an example of them to others.”128 Though technically illegal to treat these dissidents
inhumanely, victims are often “violently abducted, denied their right to due legal process and
contact with loved ones or lawyers, and are at high risk of torture while in custody.”129 This
strategy, though potentially effective in silencing the dissidents held in detention, has backfired
in specific cases. In response to the detentions of activist Ai Weiwei, for example, netizens
domestically and internationally have rallied to create presumably more opposition towards the
government than these individuals would have, if not detained.
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(2) Ai Weiwei. In the case of Ai Weiwei, the government strategically convicted him for
tax evasion, so as to generate less attention from the public. Ai, for his entire adult life, has taken
art and politics further than almost any other Chinese artist. He defines himself as a “brand for
liberal thinking and individualism” in a country so starved for contrarians.130 After he created the
iconic Bird’s Nest for Beijing’s 2008 Olympics, Ai “grew disillusioned, calling the Olympics a
‘fake smile’ that China was putting on for the rest of the world.”131 His anti-Party attitude,
however, did not go unnoticed.
Ai was detained in 2011 not for his controversial activism and art, according to officials,
but for the reported $2.4 million in taxes he owed.132 In response to his arrest, more than 30,000
people donated over $1.3 million “via bank transfers and [by] folding cash into paper airplanes
and tossing it over a wall and into the artist’s compound in Beijing.”133 To Chinese netizens, Ai
was a hero, and they protected him like family. In this instance, the government’s attempt to
delete a dissident from the Internet’s history backfired: the response to his detention created
more controversy than he would have, if left to freely express himself. Ai Weiwei remains one of
the biggest celebrities in China, and bloggers around the world pay their respects to him daily.

[V]

The Effect of China’s Censorship Internationally
We will now look at China’s censorship strategy through an international lens. Globally,

how is this form of repression perceived? We will look at responses from Western governments
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and non-governmental organizations. Finally, we will look at whether China has paid a price for
its application of Internet censorship.
(1) Western governmental criticisms of censorship. The United States, specifically, has
voiced its concern about China’s oppressive policies and responses regarding Internet
censorship. During her time as Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice established the Global
Internet Freedom Task Force (GIFT) to provide an outlet for U.S. foreign policy responses to
violations of human rights and Internet freedoms committed by repressive governments around
the world, specifically including China.134 GIFT promotes Internet freedom by measuring and
documenting Internet censorship policies and publicizing them in its annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices.135 By publishing China’s improvements or digressions on restrictions,
the international community is holding the Party responsible for its actions. In November of
2009, President Obama publicly urged China to allow unrestricted Internet access. In January of
2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton encouraged U.S. companies to “oppose censorship in
their overseas operations.”136 In her speech, Clinton claimed “it’s about whether we live on a
planet with one Internet, one global community, and a common body of knowledge that benefits
and unites us all, or a fragmented planet in which access to information and opportunity is
dependent on where you live and the whims of censors.”137 Though the U.S. government actors
continue to speak out against the Party’s censorship strategy, we have seen no substantial efforts
on behalf of the CCP to increase Internet freedoms. If the government’s poor treatment of
dissidents continues, Western governments will be forced to intervene. Internet censorship, in
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this sense, is inhibiting global relationships and retarding China’s emergence in the international
scene.
(2) Western NGO criticisms of censorship. International organizations have been
pressuring China to adjust its Internet censorship policies since the early 2000s. In 2005, HRW
requested that democratic nations encourage the Chinese Communist Party to rethink censorship
policies.138 The pressure applied from international organizations such as HRW has led certain
global companies to withdraw business from China. Google, for example, announced in January
of 2010 that it would no longer “accept censorship of its search engine in China,” and its
withdrawal was viewed “as an important step to protect human rights online.”139 This is an
example of China’s censorship closing their once open doors to the international world. Google’s
“resolve to avoid complicity with such violations of freedom of expression and association,”
according to HRW, “deserves praise.”140 We have to wonder if this will be a growing trend in the
coming years, as the Internet in democratic regimes becomes more transparent while China’s
censorship remains oppressive.
(3) Has China paid a price? In regards to illegal detentions of dissidents and activists, the
Chinese government “routinely asserts that it only imposes restrictions on expression in line with
Chinese law, neglecting to mention that such laws are incompatible with international
standards.”141 As China continues to float away from international expectations of freedom of
expression, eyebrows are raising around the world. Again, these strict censorship laws are much
more than an inconvenient disconnect between Chinese citizens and the rest of the world. They
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are a blatant disregard for international norms, and could serve to prove China’s immaturity to
the global community.

[VI]

Summary
The Communist Party’s relationship with the Internet has fluctuated significantly in the

past ten years. The methods of censorship have adjusted to meet the varied challenges to the
authoritarian regime, whether it is a budding revolution or an embarrassing misstep on behalf of
the Party. In general, the main apathetic masses, which account for the overwhelming majority of
Internet users, have remained relatively unaffected by censorship restrictions. The Party has
focused efforts on the small segment of potentially dangerous dissidents, and this approach has
proven successful. The harsh treatment of influential rebels, however, has attracted attention
from both governments and watchdog organizations internationally.
Though the Party has been able to squash attempts at uprisings and block sensitive
material online, its treatment of dissidents and its continued oppression are topics of concern
among its increasingly liberalized world powers. A regime so insecure about its monopoly is
considered volatile and immature: two undesirable characteristics of a potential international
partner. Are the sacrifices – money, manpower, and a respectable international reputation –
worth the benefits of an unchallenged monopoly? This question will be debated as long as
China’s Internet censorship policies exist, but for now, the Party will continue to do whatever it
takes to maintain its unrestricted powers.

Chapter 4:
Conclusion

The Party’s relationship with the Internet, as we have seen, is extremely complicated.
Since the Internet’s introduction in 1994, the CCP has been constantly adjusting and readjusting
its approach to censorship. By evaluating its policies and relationship with citizens and their
Internet use, we can assume that the Party’s top priority is maintaining its unquestioned
monopoly. To control the potential for threats posed by the Internet, the CCP has carefully
crafted an intricate censorship strategy. Resources dedicated to this mission include billions of
dollars, hundreds of thousands of employed citizens, and immeasurable hours of brainpower.
The Party’s layered approach to censorship is outlined by its formal regulations, which
officially prohibit potentially controversial materials. Citizens who choose to challenge these
regulations by attempting to discuss disapproved subjects will be blocked by the “Great
Firewall” of Internet censorship. The Firewall is the CCP’s foundation for technological
solutions to censoring material: citizens searching controversial material are met with error
messages and occasionally flagged for inappropriate behavior. These flagged users, then, are
confronted with even stricter website blocking, content filtering, and keyword alerts.
Additionally, the activity of these potentially dangerous users is actively intervened by
government-enlisted Internet police. Aside from forced censorship online, the Party also
encourages self-censorship of users.
Self-censoring is promoted by peer pressure, fear of unknown consequences for
controversial behavior, and the Party’s harsh treatment of dissidents. The CCP has gone to
extremes to silence controversial and popular activists online. Though the Party’s secretive and

violent reactions to those who challenge its power have discouraged others from following suit,
they have attracted international attention and condemnations. The Communist Party’s blatant
disregard for international norms has been carefully monitored by governments and watchdog
groups worldwide. This is one of the several repercussions the CCP faces for propagating such
strict Internet policies.
Aside from the international backlash resulting from China’s censorship strategy, the
Party has also witnessed decreased support from Chinese citizens. In an increasingly globalized
world, some governments are utilizing the Internet to create closer bonds with their citizens,
while the CCP is doing quite the opposite. The Party’s lack of transparency has become a
profound source of concern for the population, especially regarding public health or safety
issues. Internet censorship, then, is not only straining the Party’s governmental relationships
internationally, but also its relationship with citizens. Additionally, when certain Party behavior,
such as fudged reports and poor treatment of dissidents, is revealed, the government seems to
suffer more than it would have had the issues been initially confronted with honesty.
Let us revisit the case of Ai Weiwei, for example. When Ai spoke out against the Party’s
careful web of lies regarding the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, he was swiftly removed from the
public’s eye. He was detained by the Party, and reportedly physically abused. Fearless, Ai posted
photos of his abuse online, and continued to garner support from Chinese and foreign netizens
alike. A number of international non-governmental organizations spoke out against the Party’s
decision to withhold and torture Ai, in 2011, for his controversial statements. His voice, then,
grew louder than it would have had the Party allowed him to speak freely initially. What does
this tell us about the nature of the Party’s system? Is the Internet censorship strategy self-

defeating? This will continue to be a debate, online and offline, both within China and among its
international partners.
In 2000, Bill Clinton was quoted stating that China’s attempt to crack down on Internet
usage is like “trying to nail Jello to the wall.”142 The Party’s efforts are commonly considered not
only futile, but harmful to Chinese growth. We have witnessed major corporations, such as
Google, pull out of China due to its censorship strategies and subsequent human rights abuses. In
this case, the Party refused to negotiate terms with Google, and more than twenty other U.S.
companies, demanding that Google strictly censor sensitive information online. The CCP even
went so far as to attack Google email accounts of Chinese human rights activists, as well as
“dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based [Google email] users who are advocates of human
rights in China.”143 By breaking any semblance of trust between the government and Google, the
Party effectively forced the corporation to pull out of the country.
Despite these severe consequences, however, the Party shows no signs of loosening its
leash on the Internet population. Its grip only tightened after the Internet-fueled Middle Eastern
uprisings of 2011, in which authoritarian states were overthrown by their proactive citizens. The
Party continues to pour money and manpower into its censorship strategy, and is apparently
unfazed by the subsequent backlash. Until there is intervention, on behalf of suffocated citizens
or the international community, the CCP will continue with its repression of online speech.
China has witnessed outstanding economic growth in the past decade, and is currently a leading
world power. The Party’s Internet censorship policy, however, ideologically conflicts with its
growth as a modern superpower. We must wonder, then, how long can the Party continue to
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silence the voice of its people before its international standing is challenged? For this, we will
have to wait and observe the apathy of Chinese citizens, the finesse of the Party, and the
involvement of the international community.
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